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James ( Jim) Marshall's avatar

Well I am not seeing anything that will change my thinking about a lot of cash, metals, and energy stocks and a couple commodity and P&C insurance stocks. Yep the ride we are on isn't going to end well.

Jim Marshall

Attila Rebak's avatar

Perhaps 1980–2020 was the exception, not the rule.

For decades, extraordinary forces masked the tension between credit-created demand and scarce real resources. China and the former Eastern Bloc entered the global economy; globalisation added hundreds of millions of workers to the effective labour pool, and computers, the internet and global supply chains generated enormous productivity gains. Without credit expansion, perhaps we would have experienced mild deflation rather than 2% inflation.

This matters from an Austrian perspective. Credit creation can increase monetary claims on resources, but it cannot create the real savings or real resources (labour, energy, commodities and capital goods) necessary to support them. Artificially low interest rates can obscure this mismatch for a time, but they cannot abolish scarcity.

What if the disinflationary forces that allowed this to continue for decades are now fading?

Globalisation is reversing, populations are ageing, and retirees may begin drawing down accumulated savings. Meanwhile, demand for capital is exploding. AI requires enormous investment in chips, data centres, electricity generation and grids. Its huge financing requirements and weak free cash flow show how capital-intensive the buildout is. Energy itself may become a bottleneck, while geopolitical conflicts, including Iran, add further inflationary risk.

So we may simultaneously have less genuine saving and greater competition for real capital.

A recession does not necessarily solve the problem. It lowers private demand, but it can also worsen deficits and debt-to-GDP ratios. If bond investors become increasingly concerned about the fiscal trajectory, they demand higher yields, which raises government interest expense and requires still more borrowing.

This may explain why the interest-rate trend changed around 2022. The central bank can suppress the price of capital for a while, but it cannot indefinitely suppress the underlying competition for scarce real resources.

Eventually the adjustment must appear somewhere: inflation, higher real interest rates, falling asset prices, failed investments, lower consumption, or fiscal retrenchment.

Perhaps the great bond bull market ended because the extraordinary world that made it possible ended with it.

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