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FVM's avatar

Another "unprecdented Trump innovation" that turns out to have many precedents. A summary for the ahistorical:

The United States began to “weaponize” the financial payments system in a recognizable modern sense during the Second World War and early Cold War, then transformed it into a central instrument of power with post‑1970s sanctions law and, after 9/11, with dollar‑ and SWIFT‑centric financial controls that now reach the entire global banking network. What began as wartime asset freezes and trade embargoes has evolved into a dense, permanent machinery of primary and secondary sanctions that can cut states, firms, and individuals off from the dollar and from cross‑border payments altogether.

Early foundations (1917–1950s)

In 1917 Congress passed the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA), giving the president power to regulate or prohibit financial transactions with foreign enemies in wartime, laying the core legal basis for asset freezes and payment controls.

During the Great Depression and World War II, Franklin Roosevelt used TWEA’s section 5(b) to shut banks in 1933 and then to freeze European assets, creating a precedent for peacetime and pre‑war financial blocking as a tool of foreign policy.

Institutionalization of sanctions (Cold War era)

After 1945, the United States created specialized bureaucratic machinery, culminating in the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), to administer trade and financial sanctions as routine policy instruments rather than ad hoc wartime measures.

The Cold War saw long‑running sanctions regimes against countries like Cuba and Vietnam that combined trade restrictions with broad blocking of financial transactions and dollar payments, foreshadowing later, more targeted financial warfare.

From trade embargoes to financial leverage (1970s–1990s)

In the 1970s and 1980s, Congress embedded automatic sanctions triggers into laws such as amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act and Trade Act, mandating economic and financial penalties for human‑rights abuses, terrorism, and narcotics, thereby expanding the situations in which financial tools had to be used.

The Reagan administration’s attempts to apply “secondary sanctions” extraterritorially—such as restricting re‑exports of U.S. technology to the Soviet Union and pressuring European firms over the Soviet gas pipeline—marked an early effort to extend control beyond U.S. territory into allied financial and commercial decisions.

Post‑9/11 financial weaponization

After the attacks of 11 September 2001, the U.S. built a new model of financial warfare: instead of only blocking specific accounts or trade, it designated individuals, banks, and entities on Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) lists and threatened any bank that dealt with them, effectively turning the global banking system into an enforcement arm.

Because most global trade and finance is invoiced or cleared in dollars through U.S.‑linked banks, these measures allow Washington to make foreign banks and firms choose between access to the U.S. financial system and dealings with sanctioned parties, giving sanctions the character of a precision coercive tool with global reach.

SWIFT, secondary sanctions, and today’s system

The United States has leveraged both dollar clearing and the SWIFT messaging network—whose infrastructure and data flows are partially exposed to U.S. legal and regulatory authority—to amplify its ability to monitor and interrupt cross‑border payments, even when no U.S. party is directly involved.

Since at least the 2010s, Washington has repeatedly threatened or used sanctions that target foreign banks and infrastructures (e.g., over Iranian banking and later Russian banks), making access to the dollar payments system and SWIFT contingent on alignment with U.S. geopolitical aims and prompting widespread discussion of “weaponization of the dollar.”

Tom Langdon's avatar

Bill, enjoyed your cogent comments today. The printing of dollars kicks the can farther down the road and makes us all poorer in the long run, as well polluting other industrialized economies given the hegemony of the dollar. The result of this less than perseient behavior has been the rise of BRICS and the Chinese Belt and Road initiative. The Great Reset is in motion and it will not be good for Americans.

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